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I

Abstract
A network intrusion detection system (NIDS) is one important element to mitigate
cybersecurity risks, the NIDS allow for detecting anomalies in a network which may
be a cyberattack to a corporate network environment. A NIDS can be seen as a classification problem where the ultimate goal is to distinguish between malicious traffic
among a majority of benign traffic. Researches on NIDS are often performed using
outdated datasets that don’t represent the actual cyberspace. Datasets such as the
CICIDS2018 address this gap by being generated from attacks and an infrastructure
that reflects an up-to-date scenario.
A problem may arise when machine learning classification algorithms are trained
on a dataset that presents class imbalance towards a majority, which is the case of
CICIDS2018 data where the majority class is skewed to legitimate traffic. Such problem can be tackled by modifying a dataset probability distribution by augmenting
the existing data to achieve balance in the dataset. Many different methods can be
used to do so, ranging from naive approaches like random oversampling or undersampling; Machine learning with SMOTE and Decision Trees; Or even sophisticated deep
learning models such as the GAN and CTGAN.
An evaluation of the different data-augmentation methods for training a random
forest classifier task showed that ROS and SMOTE are competitive in detecting attacks, while CTGAN demonstrated to better recognize benign samples and provide
a balance between security and functionality for the network, however at a computational resource expense.
Keywords:

CICIDS2018, Network Intrusion Detection System, Imbalanced Learn-

ing, Data Augmentation, Deep Learning
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An anomaly-based network intrusion detection system looks for malicious traffic patterns in a network, these malicious samples will be a minority regarding the legitimate
traffic produced by business softwares, internet browsing or any other non-malicious
network activity. A NIDS can be implemented as a classification algorithm to distinguish between malicious and benign traffic, but since minority of the traffic is malicious,
the classifier predictions may be biased towards the benign samples. This problem is
known as imbalanced learning or class imbalance problem.

1.1

Background

Cyber threats are a risk for the many business that rely on computer networks —
such as the internet — to perform day-to-day operations. These networks have many
benefits; they allow for integrate with other companies which potentially increases
business opportunities, market availability, and ultimately, revenue. On the other
hand, being part of a network also increases information security risks capable of
doing financial and reputation damage or even shutting down an entire company.
Technologies such as a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) can be placed
between the internet connection or in front of a company’s most risky assets to detect,
prevent and contain internal and external attacks. A NIDS can detect malicious
network traffic in two ways, signature-based by comparing traffic to known attack
1
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patterns and anomaly-based for unknown attacks such as never seen before.
Network attacks generally follow similar patterns, often scripts and programmes
available to public use. New attacks are being launched and discovered every day,
signature-based detection requires regular maintenance on the NIDS signature database1 ,
obsolete signatures should also be deleted to assure a NIDS performance, by the other
hand signature-based detection is less susceptible to False Positives.
Zero-day are attacks which haven’t yet been seen and are immune to pattern-based
recognition, worse still known attacks may be altered slightly to avoid detection. Machine learning models can be taught to recognize these anomalous patterns, anomalybased detection looks for sudden unexplained differences in network traffic, meaning it
can detect previously unseen patterns. The attack detection can be performed using
different methods such as artificial neural networks, Bayesian nets, clustering, decision
trees, ensemble models, support vector machines, association and fuzzy rules. (Buczak
& Guven, 2016; Biswas, 2018).
It is expected that the major part of a company network traffic to be benign
and ideally the NIDS must not interfere with it, which could impact operations by
for example, disrupting critical business applications availability. However, machine
learning models can have their prediction ability negatively impacted when trained on
skewed data, thus favouring the most occurring class, this problem is also known as
imbalanced data or class-imbalance problem (Weiss et al., 2007; Parkinson de Castro,
2020).
A solution to the imbalanced data problem is to increase the number of minority class samples, for example hiring an external company to exhaustively attack a
network, which implies in costs and can impact business availability. That’s where
synthetic data generation can be an approach to achieve class balance and improve
NIDS performance, ranging from more basic implementations such as random oversampling (ROS) and undersampling (RUS), to machine-learning based on k-nearest neighbours and decision tree like Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE)
and Classification and Regression Trees (CART) respectively, to more advanced tech1

https://www.ciscopress.com/articles/article.asp?p=133642
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niques making use deep generative models such as Generative Adversarial Networks
(GAN) and its derivatives like the Conditional Tabular GAN (CTGAN).
Goodfellow et al. (2014) proposed the GAN, a generative model trained in an
adversarial way, the architecture consists of two Neural Networks, the generator and
discriminator trained simultaneously while competing a min-max game where the generator objective is to maximize the discriminator loss and, the discriminator objective
to minimize his own loss. The adversarial training can be exemplified as the generator being an art forger and the discriminator an detective specialized in art, at
beginning the generator will reproduce the real arts in a very poorly manner and the
discriminator will classify the generator work as fake, then eventually the generator
will improve based on the discriminator’s feedback. The discriminator will spot and
exploit weaknesses in the generated samples, the generator is then forced to overcome
that weaknesses to produce better samples. This training should continue until the
discriminator is no longer able to distinguish between real and fake/generated samples,
that’s when the min-max loss is achieved. This website 2 shows pictures of people that
doesn’t actually exist, they are all generated from a type of GAN (Karras et al., 2019).

1.2

Research Project/problem

Companies must protect themselves against cyber-attacks to avoid reputational and
financial damage, fines from compliance breaches and leakage of trade secrets3 . A NIDS
is one of the components to assure network security, it should prefer to misclassify
benign traffic as malicious rather than malicious as benign, thus defining the main
metrics as recall, precision and F1-Score. The metrics should be maximized, if recall
is low it means attacks are not being detected, while lower precision will result in
a security analyst wasting time reviewing false positives, the F1-Score will give a
balanced score between recall and precision.
A NIDS can be implemented as a classification model to distinguish between mali2
3

https://thispersondoesnotexist.com
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/business/suppliers-data-leak-automakers.html
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cious and benign traffic, major part of a company network traffic should be benign —
so the traffic used to teach the NIDS — however machine learning models may bias
its predictions towards the most common class, which is benign traffic. One approach
to solve this bias/imbalanced learning problem is to increase the number of a minority
class on the training data of a classification model.
One of the simplest ways of dealing with class imbalance is by randomly copying
samples from the minority class into the dataset, or even randomly removing samples
from the majority class. SMOTE and CART are also two methods to deal with class
imbalance by augmenting the minority class in a machine learn fashion.
GANs have successfully generated synthetic images and tabular data but are known
to be difficult to train (Arjovsky et al., 2017), approaches like Wasserstein GAN
(WGAN), WGAN with Gradient Penalty (WGAN-GP) and CTGAN were designed
to address known issues from the GAN such as mode collapse, vanishing gradients and
non-convergence, further explained in section 2.6.1.
These deep generative methods will be explored as a synthetic data generator to
achieve class balance in a classifier model. The goal of this project is to evaluate
to what extent the different data generation methods will improve the NIDS recall,
precision and F1-Score.

1.3

Research Objectives

The motivation behind including the deep learning approaches in the tests is that
the GAN and its derivatives seems promising generator models given their ability to
generate high quality images. Rigaki and Garcia (2018) have used a GAN to adapt
malware to avoid being detected by a NIDS. Although it is necessary to simulate an
attacker capability against a target, the defence for such state-of-the-art offensives
must be planned. In how many other ways could such innovative use of GAN concepts
contribute to the protection of the cyberspace?
The CICIDS2018 (Sharafaldin. et al., 2018) is a benchmark dataset for network
intrusion detection systems. It was collected during a simulation of a company being

4
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attacked. This fictional organization has 420 workstations and 30 servers among 5
departments, while the attacking infrastructure is made of 50 computers.
In a real company network major part of the traffic is benign and a minority would
be malicious, that’s also reflected in the CICIDS2018. A classifier trained on imbalanced data can have its predictions biased towards the majority class, and may not
detect malicious traffic to an acceptable degree. Although the dataset is imbalanced,
with 87% instances belonging to the negative class (benign); correctly classifying the
minority class (attack) is of great importance to NIDS. A false negative, allowing malicious traffic is potentially catastrophic to a network. While a false positive, would
imply in inadvertently blocking benign traffic, usually causing minor inconveniences.
Modifying the training dataset distribution by augmenting the malicious samples is
one way to workaround the imbalanced learning issue. This experiment will compare
the performance of a NIDS implemented as a random forest (RF) classifier trained
on CICIDS2018, with different methods of data-augmentation such as ROS, RUS,
SMOTE, CART, GAN and CTGAN, these methods will be evaluated regarding their
precision, recall and F1-Score.
It is important that the generated samples follow the same distribution and featureinterdependencies of the real data, leading to sub-question 1 : To what extent are
the synthetic generated samples capable of capturing the original data distribution
and correlations.
A random forest will distinguish between benign and malicious traffic regardless of
which attack type the malicious traffic represents, leading to sub-question 2 : Will
the data augmentation methods influence on the misclassification of each attack type?
Research objective: Compare the effect of adding GAN, CTGAN, ROS, RUS,
CART or SMOTE generated samples to augment the minority classes of CICIDS2018
dataset to train a random forest classifier model in terms of model recall, precision
and F1-score.
Research question: To what extent adding synthetic generated samples to augment the minority classes of CICIDS2018 dataset to train a random forest classifier
model is capable of improving the model precision, recall and F1-Score.
5
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1.4

Research Methodologies

This project is a secondary research since it relies on network flow traffic data collected
by (Sharafaldin. et al., 2018) and available on Amazon4 , they developed a benchmark
dataset with the latest attacks in a simulated organization, the CICIDS2018 allows
building and evaluation of a NIDS on this empirical experiment to answer the research
questions and hypothesis. Different NIDS models implemented as Random Forest classifier will be trained on the original data which is imbalanced and also on data balanced
with samples generated from ROS, RUS, SMOTE, CART, GAN and CTGAN. Recall,
precision and F1-Score of such models will then be compared, analysed and discussed
to answer the research question.

1.5

Scope and Limitations

The scope of this research is the creation of synthetic attack samples to address the
class imbalance issue present on CICIDS2018. Only a part of the dataset will be used,
further details are given in section 2.1, this reduced dataset will decrease experiment
time and facilitate GAN training which is known to be difficult and computationally
expensive.
This research will not focus on the creation or tuning of classification models for
the NIDS, it will use Random Forests (RF) trained on different data augmentation
techniques to distinguish between benign or malicious network traffic, the different RF
will then be evaluated regarding their recall, precision and F1-Score.
This work scope is dealing with imbalanced learning at data-level only, which
implies in modify the distribution of the training dataset, such as adding samples to
the training. The methods to deal with imbalanced learning at data-level are limited
here to ROS, RUS, SMOTE, CART, GAN and CTGAN. Not in the scope of this
work, but imbalanced learning can also be tackled at algorithm-level by for example
setting weights to the classes during classifier training or setting decision thresholds
on a classifier prediction.
4

s3://cse-cic-ids2018/
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Signature-based detection is out of the scope together with hybrid-based detection which is a mix of both anomaly and signature-based detections, although in a
production scenario the is more likely a NIDS would use a hybrid-based approach.
Host-based intrusion detection is also out of scope, it consists for example in analysing
usage of computational resources such as memory, processor, storage, processes and
network usage from an operating system or virtualizer perspective. This research will
focus on network-based intrusion detection systems only.

1.6

Document Outline

The following chapters of this dissertation are outlined below
Chapter 2: This chapter presents an overview of the existing literature and discussions with respect to the imbalanced learned problem, how other research has dealt
with such, and what are the opportunities for improvement in this area.
Chapter 3: Details the proposed experiment framework designed to answer the
hypothesis and research questions towards the project objective.
Chapter 4: Presents an actual implementation of the proposed experiment, what
went well, limitations, issues, workarounds and outcomes that allow to draw conclusions regarding the research.
Chapter 5: This chapter summarizes the results, observations and insights of the
findings, with potential extension for this research.

7

Chapter 2
Review of existing literature
A NIDS is an important piece to mitigate information security risks, a minority of the
traffic analysed by a NIDS would be malicious. The imbalance between minority and
majority class — respectively malicious and benign — can bias a NIDS decision to
the predict most frequent class. This research focuses on solving the class imbalance
problem by investigating the effect of applying different data-augmentation methods
to an imbalanced dataset.
In this chapter, it is explained the dataset used in the proposed experiment, the
problems underlying imbalanced data and how other research dealt with similar problems. The data-augmentation techniques employed range from Naive approaches to
sophisticated deep learning algorithms, where some techniques were applied to similar
datasets by other research. The implementation of a NIDS as a binary classification
problem using a Random Forest. Finally, the evaluation metrics, where conclusions
will be based on.

2.1

Dataset

Researchers often use outdated network intrusion datasets such as DARPA, KDDCUP and NSL-KDD (based on KDD-CUP), from 1998, 1999 and 2006 respectively
(Khraisat et al., 2019), the internet has changed a lot since then and so have the cyber
threats. Newer datasets such as the CICIDS2018 contemplate more recent attack
8
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types and techniques often seen today. The CICIDS2018 is part of a project that has
created other IDS benchmark datasets1 in the past such as the ISCXIDS2012 (Shiravi
et al., 2012) and the CICIDS2017 (Sharafaldin et al., 2019).
The project creates datasets using a systematic approach based on profiles to generate benign (B-Profile) and malicious (M-Profile) traffic. B-Profile is composed of
data generated from users or from the CIC-BenignGenerator (Sharafaldin et al., 2017)
and M-Profile is derived from various attack types such as password guessing, web
application exploitation, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), internal and external
port scanning. The CICIDS2018 is available 10 different files in CSV format, which
was parsed to a network flow format using CICFlowMeter2 (Lashkari. et al., 2017;
Draper-Gil. et al., 2016) from PCAP files, a standard format of low-level network
traffic capture at interface level.

Figure 2.1: CICIDS2018 Network Topology (Sharafaldin. et al., 2018)

Leevy and Khoshgoftaar (2020) surveyed papers on classification models based on
CICIDS2018 and found a gap on how the class balance is dealt, this impact on the
researches reproducibility. The same author also mention works that used accuracy as
a metric for a classification task on CICIDS2018, the accuracy metric can be misleading
as it doesn’t take in consideration what the model have failed to identify and could
mask the problem of imbalanced learning thus an inefficient classifier for the given
domain.
1
2

https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/index.html
https://github.com/ahlashkari/CICFlowMeter
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2.2

Imbalanced Learning

The imbalanced learning problem occurs when one of the classes of a dataset is less
frequent in proportion with the other(s), as shown in figure 2.2. For (Weiss et al., 2007)
classifiers trained on imbalanced datasets can have their predictions biased towards
the most common class, for example in credit card fraud detection, a minority of the
samples will be fraud and a classifier may not be able to predict when it is a fraud or
a just a normal transaction, to a level that matches a business risk appetite.

Figure 2.2: An imbalanced dataset with two classes

Prati et al. (2009) synthesizes the concepts, metrics and also methods to counteract underrepresentation of classes in datasets for inferring classification models, they
explain that the problem of imbalanced data can be tackled at either data-level by
modifying the train set distribution or at algorithm-level by providing misclassification
cost information prior to training or posterior by defining decision thresholds. The
same authors also mention a hybrid approach which is a mix of data and algorithm
level methods.
Japkowicz and Stephen (2002) researched on how different types of imbalanced data
in terms of training set size and imbalance proportion do affect classification algorithms
such as C5.0, neural networks and support vector machines (SVM), and found that
data and algorithm level methods to deal with class imbalance will have a different
effect based on the dataset size and complexity. Buda et al. (2018) explored imbalanced
data effects and possible counteracts for the problem at both data and algorithm levels
on a convolutional neural network (CNN) classifier trained on three different image

10
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datasets, they found that ROS outperformed RUS and decision thresholding and then
recommended a hybrid approach of both data and algorithm level methods to deal
with class imbalance.
Seiffert et al. (2008) evaluated the effects of using four data-level manipulations:
ROS, RUS, SMOTE and borderline-SMOTE, and also algorithm-level approaches:
Cost-Sensitive Classifier and modifying the decision threshold of a classification algorithm. The tests were executed on 15 datasets, where RUS performed significantly
better at higher imbalance ratios, and the algorithm-level approaches outperformed
ROS, SMOTE and borderline-SMOTE. The two algorithm-level Cost-Sensitive Classifier and modifying the decision threshold had similar performance.
Pawlicki et al. (2020) tested a RF to classify CICIDS2017 traffic, the authors tested
ROS, RUS, borderline-SMOTE and other undersampling techniques such as TomekLinks, and also at algorithm-level a weighted classification in the RF. Surprisingly RUS
outperformed the other data-level balancing methods. But in overall, the algorithmlevel approach had the best recall values.
Although literature suggest an algorithm-level (Pawlicki et al., 2020; Seiffert et al.,
2008) or hybrid (Prati et al., 2009) approach to the imbalanced learning problem, this
work is focusing only on the data-level scope, although the classifier proposed here
could be tested at different decision threshold levels, a data-level approach is agnostic
to one objectives for using the data. A data-level method to deal with imbalance
allows to train other classification models that are sensitive to class imbalance, such
as neural networks (Buda et al., 2018).

2.3

Random Forest IDS

Detecting anomalies in a computer network can be a challenge, because of the high
volume and dimensionality of data, false positive alerts caused by network traffic normal profile change and intruders adapting their attack techniques to evade detection,
making past detection methods obsolete (Chandola et al., 2009).
Random Forest (Breiman, 2001) is a type of ensemble model that is computation-
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ally efficient and is less prone to imbalanced learning problems, RF can deal with high
dimensional data (Chen et al., 2004), such as network intrusion. A RF is composed
of many decision trees, as seen in figure 2.3, each tree will vote towards a target class,
these votes are weighted by the probability estimative for the analysed sample be a
malicious or benign network traffic, for example.

Figure 2.3: Random forest prediction.

RF have been used to classify IDS data on other similar datasets such as the
CICIDS2017 (Lee & Park, 2019b, 2019a), and other datasets such Kyoto 2006+ in
(Park et al., 2018) and NSL-KDD in (Tesfahun & Bhaskari, 2013), and outside of
cybersecurity by (Khalilia et al., 2011) to predict disease risks from highly imbalanced
data. In this work a RF will be implemented to act as the network intrusion detection
system.

2.4

Naive Strategies

Random Oversampling (ROS) is one of the simplest approaches to deal with imbalanced learn, it consists in copying random samples from the minority class until the
imbalance is solved, it is also known as sampling with replacement. The shortcoming
of ROS is that it increases the chance of overfitting models. Random Undersampling
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(RUS), is another naive approach that is based on randomly removing samples from
the majority classes to achieve balance, with the shortcoming that valuable information can be lost (Mishra, 2017). Both ROV and RUS are very easy to implement
because they don’t perform any heuristical decision to deal with data and can serve
as a baseline to compare more advanced methods.

2.5
2.5.1

Machine Learning
SMOTE

Proposed by (Chawla et al., 2002) SMOTE is one method to augment data to overcome
the imbalanced learning problem, by creating synthetic samples from an interpolation
between nearest neighbours.
A synthetic sample S is generated from the difference between a randomly chosen
sample Si and one other sample in its nearest neighbour Sn multiplied by a random
number between 0 and 1 and then added to the chosen sample, described in equation
below.
S = Si + (|Sn − Si|) ∗ rand[0, 1]
SMOTE consists in selecting samples from a minority class clustering them into
k-nearest neighbours and creating new data points between the neighbours as shown
in figure 2.4 where the minority class is in red and the synthetic samples sit in between
the original samples.

Figure 2.4: SMOTE interpolation between samples.
SMOTE is simple to implement and the only heuristic required is clustering the
samples in k nearest neighbours. The downside of SMOTE is that it can create an
13
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overlap with other similar classes leading to a fuzzy decision boundary which can cause
noise in the synthetic data. Such issue is mentioned in a research to improve detection
of Android malwares in an imbalanced dataset and was reworked by Y. Xu et al.
(2017) by increasing the number of minority samples near the decision boundaries.

2.5.2

CART

Classification and Regression Trees (CART) were proposed by (Breiman et al., 1984),
and used by (Reiter, 2003) to generate synthetic data to address privacy issues on
sensitive values of microdata, to allow its publication. Sabay et al. (2018) have used
CART to create a surrogate dataset to deal with class imbalance and privacy issues
in Breast Cancer and Nursery datasets and successfully trained a classifier model.
Synthetic data generation using CART consists in predicting the next feature based
on the previous features, so the last feature will be conditional on all the previous
features, thus preserving correlations, the first feature is a special case and is randomly
sampled with replacement from the original dataset (Nowok et al., 2016), as shown in
figure 2.5.

Figure 2.5: Synthetic data generation based on CART.
CART models are capable of working with non-gaussian distributions and capturing non-linear relationships like network intrusion data, but can be hard to be interpret
the generated model (Caiola & Reiter, 2010), which is not a problem on this research

2.6
2.6.1

Deep Learning
GAN

A Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) is a machine learning architecture consisting of two neural networks, the generator and the discriminator who compete against
14
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each other in a min-max game. The generator wants to maximize and the discriminator to minimize the loss of the discriminator. These two neural networks are trained
simultaneously, from random noise the generator will learn how to produce fake samples that look like real data. These fake samples from the generator will feed to the
discriminator along with samples from a dataset of real data, the discriminator job
then is to distinguish/predict if a sample is real data or is a fake sample produced
from the generator. Again, the idea is that the generator should be able to produce
fake data that is very similar to the real data distribution so that the discriminator is
not able to distinguish between genuine and fake data, as shown in 2.7.

Figure 2.6: GAN training objective.
The training process for the generator consists in feeding the generator input layer
with random data of fixed size, for example an array 128 of random numbers between
-1 and 1, this values will then feed forward to the neural network layers until it reaches
the output layer, the output layer size should be of the same size of the original data,
for example the number of columns in a dataset, by this time the fake sample is ready
to be evaluated by the discriminator.
The discriminator will be trained by analysing samples from the generator and also
from real data, these samples will feed to the discriminator input layer that should
have the same size as the original data, the samples are then feed forward until it
reaches the discriminator output layer of size one, which will return a value of 1 for
real and 0 for fake, for example.
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Figure 2.7: GAN training flow

The discriminator loss value will be calculated based on the misses and hits from
his predictions of real and fake samples, while the generator loss is based only on the
discriminator predictions of the fake samples, the generator doesn’t care about real
samples.
Each model having its separate loss value allows to calculate the derivative of the
error gradient and backpropagate adjustments to the layers of each model. GAN
training will occur until the generator is able to produce synthetic data that assembles
real data, for example in figure 2.6 one wants to the red portion (synthetic samples)
being the most similar as the green mass (real samples).
Lee and Park (2019b, 2019a) have implemented a GAN to generate data to solve
imbalanced data issues on CICIDS2017, the predecessor of CICIDS2018, with positive
results for some classes of attacks. To simulate a malware that leverages from artificial
intelligence Shu et al. (2020) used a GAN with a variational autoencoder (VA) as the
generator, the VA is type of model that maps raw data to a hyperspace, this GAN
produced simulated malicious samples capable of bypass a neural network classifier
model acting as a NIDS.
GAN Issues
The original GAN architecture is known be difficult to train and to be applied to
generate tabular data. GAN is a trending topic and researchers are working around
the issues and exploring GAN capabilities, researches mention some common problems such as mode collapse, vanishing gradients and non-convergence and propose
16
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workarounds for such issues (Walia et al., 2020; Arjovsky et al., 2017; Karlsson &
Sjöberg, 2020; L. Xu et al., 2019).
Mode collapse is when the generator has learned to produce only a single type
or very similar outputs, and the discriminator is always fooled by this fake sample
causing the learning process to get stuck, the discriminator is not able to minimize
its loss function. For example in a GAN to generate tabular data with categorical
columns, that was the detect in the experiments conducted for this research, the GAN
learned the imbalance present in the original dataset and was producing only a single
traffic type.
Vanishing gradients happen when the discriminator is not able to provide useful
feedback for the generator, the generator loss value which is produced by the discriminator is so small that the generator won’t improve. GANs work well with images
because of their range between 0 and 255. Applying min-max transformation to a
continuous value present in a tabular dataset will be likely to cause the gradients
vanishing (L. Xu et al., 2019).
As the generator objective is to produce fake samples similar to real, at certain
point the discriminator feedback will be of less importance, it is also hard to tell when a
GAN model is producing fake samples of good quality, there’s no definitive evaluation
metric (Borji, 2019). If the GAN is trained for too long the generator may start to
produce useless samples of poor quality, that’s called non-convergence.

2.6.2

CTGAN

Conditional Tabular Generative Adversarial Network (CTGAN) was proposed by
(L. Xu et al., 2019) to address issues arising when using a GAN to generate tabular
data, such as coexistence of continuous and categorical data in the same dataset; NonGaussian distributions from continuous data that can’t go through min-max transformations; Multi-modal distributions, vanilla GAN is not able to capture continuous
values multi-modes.
CTGAN estimate the continuous columns based on the number of modes present on
the distribution, which is given by fitting a Gaussian mixture model into the columns,
17
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a value present in the third mode would be represented in a one-hot encoding vector
α = [0,0,1] vector, for example. This vector will be concatenated with a scalar β
representing the value inside that mode, that’s how a continuous column is presented
to the CTGAN generator.
The CTGAN takes in consideration that values from a categorical column may
be imbalance, and the generator may never learn the minority classes. Each categorical column value will be presented mutually excluded from any other categorical
value. Consider one row with columns D1 and D2 as ”marital status” (single, married, divorced) and ”is employed” (yes, no) to one hot encoded vector D1=[0,0,1] and
D2=[0,1]. Between the two columns ”is employed” is randomly picked, the two vectors
D1 and D2 are concatenated into a mask M = [0,0,0,0,1] this mask will be mapped
from an original sample and presented to the discriminator. The generator is free to
populate the mask with any values it wants, but will get penalized thus forcing it to
eventually learn to pick only one categorical value of only a single column value, that
also forces the generator to learn the continuous values associated with the respective
categorical value.
The continuous and categorical column representations are then concatenated and
feed to the discriminator as shown in figure 2.8

Figure 2.8: CTGAN Conditional Generator. (L. Xu et al., 2019)

CTGAN also leverages from other advancements in GAN research, it uses the
Wasserstein distance as loss on the discriminator, or critic as it’s known on the Wasserstein GAN (WGAN) (Arjovsky et al., 2017), this new loss function is the distance
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between real data and generated data distributions, similar to figure 2.6, in contrast
to the cross entropy used by the vanilla GAN, the Wasserstein distance is a meaningful
metric to tell the distance. The generator objective is to minimize distance while the
discriminator looks to maximize the distance, once the loss function gets to a value
of zero the discriminator is no longer able to distinguish between real and fake. In
WGAN the critic output is linear and ranges between -1 and 1 respectively for fake
and real, in contrast with vanilla GAN that uses sigmoid in the discriminator output
layer thus limited between 0 and 1.
To avoid vanishing gradients, and also the inverse, exploding gradients, the authors
clipped the discriminator weights in the range between -0.01 and 0.01, which the
authors in (Gulrajani et al., 2017) found to be problematic and proposed to enforce
the same constraint in form of penalty on the gradient of the discriminator. This
constraint is known as Lipschitz constrain, explanation of such mathematical property
is outside of the proposed scope for this research and can be referred in the original
paper.
The CTGAN also incorporates the packing element (Lin et al., 2017), which consist
in presenting N more samples from the same class during the discriminator training,
for example it will present 10 real samples or 10 fake samples to be analysed by the
discriminator at once, which is an efficient method to avoid mode collapse thus forcing
the GAN to diversify on the generate samples.
Tang et al. (2020) have compared classifiers trained with CTGAN augmented data
to predict oil reservoirs quality which didn’t improved the classification task. GAN
based models have been used in the financial domain to generate synthetic data.
Karlsson and Sjöberg (2020) experimented with WGAN-GP as a baseline against CTGAN, that is designed to deal with tabular data, WGAN-GP (Gulrajani et al., 2017)
had better results on continuous simulated data and CTGAN on adult census, a more
categorical dataset. (Walia et al., 2020) have compared SMOTE as a baseline against
WCGAN-GP in the efficiency on machine learning tasks and on privacy metrics with
favourable results to WCGAN-GP on cardiovascular and credit card fraud datasets,
but not on adult census which have more categorical data than the previous datasets.
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At the time of writing no other research on network intrusion detection made use of
CTGAN before.

2.7

Evaluation Methods

An evaluation framework is necessary to ensure the generated data is a reliable representation of its origin. At a first stage the synthetic data is evaluated in how similar
it is to the real data, that’s done using histograms to visually judge the distribution
shapes while pairwise correlation allows both visual and numerical inspection on the
columns dependencies. The most important metric in this experiment is the machine
learning efficiency which tells the synthetic data suitability for a classification model
inference.

2.7.1

Synthetic data quality

Synthetic data evaluation can be done in a visual manner by plotting both real and
synthetic data to a histogram. However, the histograms, do not allow to check if the
synthetic data is following the same correlations as the real data does, that motivated
to use the pairwise correlation evaluation.
Histogram
Histograms will provide visual aid to check if the synthetic data is able to follow the
same ranges of original data distributions, a histogram will be generated for each real
and synthetic column pair. The synthetic data is represented in red, real data in green,
the grey parts is when both overlaps, meaning that the synthetic data generator is
able to capture that set. It is expected that the generated data would capture the
mean and modes and that can be evaluated using a histogram.

Figure 2.9: Example of histogram comparison between real and fake data.
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Figure 2.9 is a small example of a histogram for one column, a full picture is
available in appendix A.1, the figure shows that the synthetic data has captured the
mode and some part of the real data distribution, although with the synthetic a bit
outside of the original data range.
Pairwise correlation
To tackle the histogram limitations, similarly to (Karlsson & Sjöberg, 2020) who
used a statistical measure to test synthetic data fidelity by using a correlation matrix
that provides both visual and numerical ways to evaluate. This evaluation is mainly
necessary to check if the deep learning methods are generating good quality data, since
GAN and derivatives may struggle to capture feature inter-dependencies.
The Pearson ”r” correlation coefficient tells how much two columns are correlated,
its value ranges between -1 and 1. A positive correlations value means that while one
variable X increases other variable Y will increase at similar proportion, for example
the number of times a clothes dryer machine appliance is used within a month and
the electric bill at the end of the moth. A negative value means that while a variable
X increases, other variable Y will decrease, for example the number of times one did
physical exercise will decrease chance of heart disease. A value of zero means there’s
no correlation. A matrix of correlations shows the correlation value for each pair of
variables, as shown in figure 2.10 a small example, the ones used later in this work
contain 68x68 squares and are available in the appendix A.3.

Figure 2.10: Example of correlation matrix
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Each square of synthetic data is subtracted by its real data equivalent square,
which is then transformed to an absolute value to generate a new matrix, the mean of
this new matrix will return the correlation value for each feature, by calculating the
mean again, a single value is obtained and is used to facilitate the comparison between
different synthetic datasets. A value of zero for this coefficient means the synthetic
data does follow exactly the same correlation degrees as the real data does. Good
synthetic data should have the pairwise correlation value as close to zero as possible,
and avoid going any higher.

2.7.2

Machine learning efficiency

The objective of this research is to evaluate different synthetic data generation methods
to solve the imbalanced learn problem on a classification model, machine learning
efficiency is the key measure to assess the different methods experimented here, it tell
if the data augmentation methods are suitable for machine learning tasks.
There’s no definitive evaluation metric for a machine learning classifier, the metric
must be chosen taking in consideration the problem it is trying to solve, the accuracy
metric for example can be misleading when dealing with an imbalanced dataset (Saito
& Rehmsmeier, 2015; He & Garcia, 2009; Parkinson de Castro, 2020), while precision
metric can be used when false positives are a bigger concern than false negatives,
and recall metric should be used when false negatives are more prejudicial than false
positives. For example, it is preferable to say someone has cancer and forwarding this
person to do more tests which then can confirm s/he’s healthy, than saying that there’s
no disease and the person wouldn’t seek any treatment.
Precision and Recall
In the context of network intrusion detection a model precision relates to total number
of records that are correctly detected as attacks among all the traffic, while recall tells if
the samples classified as attacks were in reality just normal traffic, to assure maximum
detection and low noise the models should respectively have high precision and high
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recall.
Precision =

Recall =

TP
TP + FP

TP
TP + FN

Considering attack the positive class and benign traffic the negative class, a true positive (TP) and a true negative (TN) respectively mean that an attack and a benign
traffic flow were correctly classified, a false positive (FP) would mean that a benign
traffic was misclassified as attack and a false negative (FN) that an attack was misclassified as benign. The impact in a real-world scenario is that a false positive could
break a legitimate business application and the false negative that an attacker successfully by-passed detection mechanisms. Is up to each business to decide on the
trade-off between FP (Precision) and FN (Recall) to match with their network security requirements.
F1-Score
Introduced by (Van Rijsbergen, 1979) F1-Score is a more robust metric for evaluating
an imbalanced classification task, it consists in the harmonic mean of precision and
recall, the F1-Score allows quicker decision process by looking at a single number per
class.
F1 =

2 ∗ P recision ∗ Recall
2 ∗ TP
=
P recision + Recall
2 ∗ TP + FP + FN

Misclassification per class
There are 12 different types of attack in the CICIDS2018, some are harder to detect
than others, by analysing the misclassification per class is possible to analyse how the
different data augmentation methods perform on different attack types.
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Chapter 3
Experiment design and
methodology
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the experiment framework developed towards
the research objective, question, sub-questions. Here’s is discussed the steps taken to
build the test framework, issues found and workarounds, to assure reproducibility of
the study.

3.1

Dataset

The CICIDS2018 a dataset of network flows, which is a summarized sequence of packages from one host to one or more hosts in a computer network, the CICIDS2018
was generated in the network topology shown in Figure 2.1. The dataset contains 82
columns, fully listed in appendix A.1, and 16,232,943 samples representing network
flows of 14 types of attacks plus benign traffic, composing approximately 83% of benign and 17% of malicious traffic flows. The CICIDS2018 was designed to be used
on network anomaly detection studies, like a classification model built to distinguish
between benign and malicious traffic to generate security alerts to contain attacks in
a hypothetical scenario. Most of the CICIDS2018 data is benign, reflecting the fact
that in a corporate network environment the vast majority of traffic is benign. As
shown in table 3.1 the target classes — attacks — are unbalanced in favour of benign
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samples, this can negatively impact classification models.
Traffic Type

Total

Percentage

Benign

12,817,082

83.07%

DDOS attack-HOIC

686,012

4.23%

DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP

576,191

3.55%

DoS attacks-Hulk

461,912

2.85%

Bot

286,191

1.76%

FTP-BruteForce

193,360

1.19%

SSH-Bruteforce

187,589

1.16%

Infilteration

161,934

1.00%

DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTest

139,890

0.86%

DoS attacks-GoldenEye

41,508

0.26%

DoS attacks-Slowloris

10,990

0.07%

DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP

1,730

0.01%

Brute Force -Web

611

0.00%

Brute Force -XSS

230

0.00%

SQL Injection

87

0.00%

Table 3.1: CICIDS2018 Class Labels

3.1.1

Data Preprocessing

According to Leevy and Khoshgoftaar (2020) there’s no detailed literature on how
CICIDS2018 can be cleaned and prepared for machine learning and the class imbalance
solved. It was noticed that some files had repeated header information on the body,
which may indicate that the parser to generate such datasets was executed more than
once or multiple files were appended to a single one. Another finding is that one of the
files ”Thuesday-20-02-2018” (sic) has more columns than the others, such as Network
Flow ID, Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP. Such columns could have been used
for designing other experiments that take into consideration where traffic is coming
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from and going to, in a real-world application these columns can be used to fine tune
a NIDS and reduce number of false positives.
The column timestamp is ignored since the problem is not analysed from a timeseries perspective, along with dst port since its pair src port is present only to a single
file on the dataset, other columns with no variance are also removed, resulting in a
68 column train and test sets. The dataset literally presented ”Infinite” values which
were are replaced by “NA”. The target variable indicates if traffic is benign or which
attack type it represents, the target variable is then expanded to two columns, the first
a boolean flag indicating if it’s an attack or benign traffic and the second, a numeric
code for the traffic type.
Data is then split into 80% for training and 20% for test using stratified sampling,
NA values are then replaced by the respective column median. Stratified sampling
allows each split to have a proportional percentage of target classes.
It is important to scale and normalize the data since some machine learning algorithms can be sensitive working with data that is not normal, such as neural networks,
which implies in the GAN and CTGAN. Standard scaler is chosen since L. Xu et al.
(2019) used a MinMax scaler to train a GAN but found that the test models didn’t
capture the distribution modes. Standard scaler normalization is fitted on the training
set and transformed both training and test sets.
Although most of the CICIDS2018 columns are numeric/continuous, it was noticed
on some columns that their top 5 most common values comprised a threshold of 99% of
the dataset, and that’s how categorical columns are defined for CART in this research,
namely columns: ack flag cnt, cwe flag count, down up ratio, ece flag cnt, fin flag cnt,
fwd psh flags, fwd urg flags, psh flag cnt, rst flag cnt, syn flag cnt, urg flag cnt. A
similar method will be applied to define categorical columns to the CTGAN, which is
explained later.
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3.2

Data Augmentation

3.2.1

ROS

Random oversampling augmented attacks to 100,000 samples for each attack type by
copying the samples with replacement until the desired number. ROS is very simple
to implement and cheap in computational requirements since no complex calculations
are required, which scales well to big datasets, in contrast to other robust machine
learning approaches. Although it may cause the classification model to overfit thus
leading to bias towards few samples from the training data, which may prejudice the
model generalization to unseen data.

3.2.2

RUS

Random undersampling limited each attack type and benign traffic to a maximum
of 50,000 samples, which is half of what was asked for ROS, SMOTE, CART, GAN
and CTGAN to generate. Like ROS, it is also very simple to implement with the
same benefits for both methods. The downside is that valuable samples may be randomly removed, which may negatively impact on the model predictions, RUS per se
doesn’t allow to delete only samples that won’t prejudice a machine learning model,
for example.

3.2.3

SMOTE

This method one could call a smart approach to oversampling when compared to ROS
and RUS. SMOTE requires a simple training of k-nearest neighbours algorithm, after
that it is possible to specify the desired number of samples to generate for each class,
which was set to 100,000. The downside of SMOTE is that it can create samples
that overlap with other classes and that may prejudice the decision boundary of the
classifier.
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3.2.4

CART

With CART it was possible to generate 100,000 samples for each attack type, but not
for SQL Injection and DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP attacks due to highly correlation
in columns, causing the algorithm to halt and sometimes crashing the application.
Fortunately, that didn’t interfere with final experimentation results as seen later in
table 4.4
Benign samples were excluded from CART training due to performance issues.
CART allows to define which columns to treat as categorical, these were selected
based on if their five most common values do comprise 99% of the distribution as
explained in 3.1.1.

3.2.5

GAN

A GAN was trained for each type of attack, batch size was dependant on the number
of training samples. The batch size was set to 32, 64, 128 for classes with less than 500,
2,000, 10,000 samples respectively, and batch size of 512 for when higher than 10,000.
All the GANs were trained for 10,000 epochs, which took a total of three hours.
The GAN architecture and parameters are detailed in table 3.2, the architecture
used on the experiments was defined based on tests using 4 to 6 columns randomly
selected from the dataset and also from a random data distribution of 4 columns. The
same tests showed that a generator input layer of size 128 produced better samples
and showed more stability than 32 and 256 neurons.
Parameter

Generator

Discriminator

Input Layer -Number of neurons

128

68 (Number of columns in training dataset)

Hidden Layer 1

128 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.2)

512 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.2)

Hidden Layer 2

256 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.2)

256 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.2)

Hidden Layer 3

512 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.2)

128 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.2)

Output Layer - Number of neurons

68 (Number of columns in training dataset) - Linear

1 - Linear

Loss function: Binary Cross Entropy. Optimizer: Adam rate at 0.0002, betas b1 = 0.9, b2 = 0.999

Table 3.2: GAN Architecture

It is worth mentioning the number of neurons on the output layer of the generator
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and the input layer of the discriminator are the same, as per table 3.2, these must be
the same number of the columns from the data one is looking to generate.

3.2.6

CTGAN

Like the GAN, individual CTGAN models were trained per attack category, the number of epochs and batch size was dependant on the number of samples available in the
training dataset.
Similar to CART, CTGAN also allows to specify the categorical columns, these
were defined after a number of tests using different thresholds for considering a column
categorical or continuous. If the top 5 most common values did comprise — a threshold
of — 80% of the column, then consider the column as categorical, for example. The
issue is that depending on the threshold set, if the number of samples for a class was
too high the application would run out of memory and crash.
The default CTGAN architecture is two layers of 256 neurons for the generator
and discriminator, but after tests it was observed that the respective crescent and
decrescent pattern for generator and discriminator did improved the results, as shown
in table 3.3, on the flip side this larger architecture had increased the training time to
72 hours.
Generator

Discriminator

Input Layer -Number of neurons

128

68 * 10 (Packs)

Hidden Layer 1

128 ReLu (BatchNorm 1D)

128 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.5)

Hidden Layer 2

256 ReLu (BatchNorm 1D)

256 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.5)

Hidden Layer 3

512 ReLu (BatchNorm 1D)

512 Leaky ReLu (Dropout, alpha: 0.5)

Output Layer - Number of neurons

68 - Linear

1 - Linear

Gradient Penalty

Adam - Decay (L2) 0.000006

Lipschitz Constraint

Loss function: Wasserstein Distance. Optimizer: Adam rate at 0.0002, betas b1 = 0.9, b2 = 0.999

Table 3.3: CTGAN Architecture

Similar to the GAN, the same principle of the number of neurons in the output and
input layers of the generator and discriminator applies to the CTGAN. However, as
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explained in section 2.6.2 the CTGAN uses the idea of packs, which means that in this
case is that 10 samples will be presented to the discriminator in each epoch, which is
one workaround against the known issue of mode collapse present in the vanilla GAN.

3.3

Experimental Design

Figure 3.1 shows the experiment flow, the train data will feed the generator methods,
the generators will be trained where applicable, once trained the generators will produce synthetic data to be evaluated regarding the generation method ability to capture
the original data distribution and correlations. To then augment the original dataset to
solve class imbalance and train a random forest, leading to a more robust test which is
the machine learning efficiency, this last test will tell which data-augmentation method
is doing a better job in solving the class imbalance problem.

Figure 3.1: Experiment Flow

3.3.1

Synthetic data quality

By analysing a histogram that plots the generated data against its real counterpart,
it is possible tell if the generator method was able to capture the data ranges and
different modes from the original data it was trained on. In the case the GAN and
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CTGAN one should look if the synthetic data is stuck to a single mode, which may
indicate mode collapse, that in practice means the generator only learned to output a
single or a limited set of samples.
The pairwise correlation can be checked either in the plots or in coefficient values,
it tells how good the generation method has captured the data correlations. The goal
is to get the synthetic data correlation plot as similar as possible to the real data plot,
while the coefficient value should be as close to zero as possible.

3.3.2

Machine learning efficiency

Machine learning efficiency metric is obtained after training a random forest to classify
the network flows as benign or malicious regardless of which attack type the sample
represents, assuming that the classifier would be able to capture new attacks that
doesn’t exist today regardless of the attack type. The data generator output is summed
with its own training data, this bigger and balanced dataset will serve as training data
for the RF, as pictured in Figure 3.1
Misclassification per class
There’s only few samples for some attack types, table 3.1 shows only 87 samples for
SQL Injection, for example. To get a better understanding and a fair comparison of
which attack categories the RF is able to detect a detailed misclassification report is
also provided.
Research Question
Machine learning efficiency is the key metric to answer the research question, as classification algorithms are negatively affected by the imbalanced learning problem. This
metric allows to evaluate To what extent adding synthetic generated samples to augment the minority classes of CICIDS2018 dataset to train a random forest classifier
model is capable of improving the model precision, recall and F1-Score
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3.4

Computational Environment

CART training and data generation was performed in R Studio with an Intel i7 processor and 16gb of RAM. All the other experiments were computed using Python 3.6
in a Google Colab notebook hosted with 25gb of Ram, 4x Intel Xeon CPU at 2.30GHz
and randomly allocated GPUs between Nvidia K80s, T4s, P4s and P100s 1 . Where
applicable the random seed was set to the number 42. Table 3.4 lists the external
software used on the experiments.
Software/Package
Tensorflow

Version

Purpose

2.4.1

Deep learning

Pytorch

1.4

Deep learning

CTGAN

0.3.1

Deep learning

Sklearn

0.23

Machine Learning

Imblearn

0.4.3

Machine Learning

Numpy

1.19.5 Vector and matrix operations

Pandas

1.1.4 Dataset operations

Matplotlib

3.2.2 Visual Graphics

Seaborn
ml-ids
Synthpop

0.11.1

Visual Graphics

NA CSV Processing, Visual Graphics
1.6.0

Machine Learning

Table 3.4: List of external libraries used
Due to computational lab environment memory limitations only the first 100,000
lines on nine out of the ten CICIDS2018 files will be read to allow CTGAN to be
trained and fairly compared to other methods. This caused to leave Infilteration (sic),
SSH and FTP Bruteforce attacks out of the experiment, still 900,000 samples to be
used 80% for training and 20% for test.

1

https://research.google.com/colaboratory/faq.html
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Results, evaluation and discussion
A classifier trained on a dataset with imbalanced data can lead to biased predictions
towards the majority class, data-augmentation techniques are one approach to deal
with such problem. The experiment evaluates the use of naive, machine learning
and deep learning approaches to deal with class imbalance when training a random
forest. This section presents results and comparisons of the implementation of such
data-augmentation techniques.

4.1

Synthetic data generation

In an early experiment it was noticed that the data generations methods CART, GAN
and CTGAN learned the class imbalance when trained with all the data, which may
indicate that these methods are sensible to class imbalance. To solve that problem,
each method trained one model per attack class, resulting in 11 different model for
GAN and CTGAN methods. For CART it was 9 models as it couldn’t learn SQL
Injection and DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP as explained in section3.2.4.
The two most basic techniques were ROS with RUS, the first consists in duplicating
existing samples until the class balance is achieved, the second reduces the number
of the majority class samples, to 50,000 in the case of this experiment. SMOTE was
other method applied, by generating data samples in between the lines of 5 k-nearest
neighbour clusters of a minority class to upsample the minority samples to 100,000
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instances each attack class.
It took 15 minutes to train nine CART models individually per attack class except
SQL Injection and DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP, these two classes have columns with
high correlation and caused the algorithm to halt, leaving these classes out of the
experiment didn’t interfere, as showed later in this section.
Eleven GAN models were trained for each attack class for 10,000 epochs which
took around three hours in total, the GAN was called to generate 100,000 samples
per class. Another eleven models were produced using a CTGAN, which took a total
of 72 hours of training, in a bespoke approach per attack class, defining batch size,
epochs and which columns to treat as categorical. The CTGAN was called to generate
100,000 samples per class.
By this time seven different datasets: Original, ROS, RUS, SMOTE, CART, GAN
and CTGAN were ready to be evaluated in terms of how well it did capture the
original data correlation and probability distributions. Table 4.1 shows how many
samples were available for the machine learning efficiency test.
Data Augmentation Method
Traffic Type

Original

CART

ROS

RUS

SMOTE

GAN

CTGAN

Benign

375157

375157

375157

50000

375157

375157

375157

Bot

64146

100000

60000

50000

100000

100000

100000

Brute Force -Web

489

100000

60000

489

100000

100000

100000

Brute Force -XSS

184

100000

60000

184

100000

100000

100000

DDOS attack-HOIC

76851

100000

60000

50000

100000

100000

100000

DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP

1384

100000

60000

1384

100000

100000

100000

DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP

79934

79934

60000

50000

100000

100000

100000

DoS attacks-GoldenEye

33206

100000

60000

33206

100000

100000

100000

DoS attacks-Hulk

6640

100000

60000

6640

100000

100000

100000

DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTest

73147

100000

60000

50000

100000

100000

100000

DoS attacks-Slowloris

8792

100000

60000

8792

100000

100000

100000

SQL Injection

70

70

60000

70

100000

100000

100000

720,000

1,355,161 1,035,157 300,765

1,475,157

1,475,157

1,475,157

Total

Table 4.1: Number of traffic sample types per augmentation method
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4.2

Synthetic data quality

Evaluation of the synthetic is one of the steps towards the research question, these
evaluations were designed with the deep learning methods in mind, the GAN is known
to be difficult to train and to be applied to tabular data. CTGAN is a GAN variant
that is designed to address known issues from the GAN, the synthetic data quality
evaluation will provide support to detect and workaround such issues.
The histograms illustrated if the generated data managed to capture real data distribution column by column. The original data which was used to train the generator
model is shown in green, the generator output in red. Where the generator managed
to capture the distribution is shown in grey, which is an overlap between real and synthetic data distributions. Figure 4.1 shows only five columns, while a full comparison
of the 68 features for each method is available in the appendix A.

Figure 4.1: CTGAN comparison histogram
By analysing the histograms in figure 4.1, it is observed in flow duration column
that both GAN and CTGAN went beyond the ranges of the original data distribution.
In column fwd pkt len max the GAN also went beyond the original data range. While
CTGAN was able to capture very specific data points between 2.7 and 5 in X axis. In
column tot fwd pkts the GAN created data points were there’s no real data, between
3 and 6. In column fwd pkt len min is the GAN struggled on that distribution that
looks to be categorical data, while the CTGAN did a good job covering the real data
points. Mode collapse, when the generator learns to produce a limited set of outputs,
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is visible in idle mean and occurred for GAN, meaning the generator models is able
to produce limited values for this column. While CTGAN managed to capture the
different modes of idle mean.
As described in section 2.7.1 the pairwise correlation has the objective to assess if
the data generation method captured the relationships between variables from which
it was trained on. A value of zero means that the dataset is exactly the same, so the
low the number the better. As shown in table 4.2 and figure 4.2 the CTGAN captured
the correlations better than GAN. The goal in figure 4.2 is to have the generator
method correlation matrix as close as possible to the original data, full size images are
available in appendix 2.6.
ROS

RUS

SMOTE

CART

GAN

CTGAN

0.09540

0.0462

0.0958

0.1051

0.2283

0.0593

Table 4.2: Pairwise Correlation

Figure 4.2: Pairwise correlation figures the original data and synthetic data from GAN,
CTGAN.

4.3

Machine learning efficiency

With the synthetic data quality inspected, the experiment continued to the most
important tests. Seven IDS models were trained on different datasets, of which six
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used data augmentation techniques as described in section 3.2, while the remaining
model used the original dataset. The models were evaluated on the same test set
in terms of precision, recall and F1-Score. Three possible scenarios are presented
as interpretations to the results, to fulfil one objectives towards the security of a
hypothetical network environment, where the objective can be one of the following:
a) have the safest environment
b) the most functional environment
c) a balance between security and functionality

Precision

Recall

F1

CART

99.3964%

99.9049%

99.6500%

SMOTE

99.0686%

99.9362%

99.5005%

ROS

99.0914% 99.9385%

99.5132%

RUS

99.6585%

99.8620%

99.7601%

GAN

99.7403%

99.8063%

99.7733%

CTGAN 99.9014%

99.9084% 99.9049%

Original

99.8353%

99.7231%

99.7792%

Table 4.3: Machine learning efficiency

Security is priority
If one is focusing to have the most secure environment, then the recall metric should
be maximized. Low recall would imply in attacks being classified as benign traffic.
The results available in table 4.3, show that ROS and SMOTE respectively have
the highest recall among all the methods, thus letting a minimal number of attacks
passing through the network. In general, every method had good performance on
recall. ROS and SMOTE recall was followed by CTGAN, CART, RUS, Original and
GAN methods.
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Functionality is priority
Although not the most performant for recall, CTGAN and GAN scored respectively
the best precision. In a real-world scenario, a high precision means they are the less
obstructive methods, with the lowest false positives. CTGAN and GAN precision were
followed by Original, RUS, CART, ROS and SMOTE. If aiming for a less obstructive
environment, the precision metric should be maximized, but with the possible downside
of being less secure. Low precision implies in legitimate traffic being classified as attack
while a low recall will not detect attacks correctly, leading to higher number of false
negatives.
Balance between security and functionality
The F1-Score is the harmonic mean between precision and recall. If one is looking for
balance between security and functionality of the network, one should maximize the
F1-Score. It is evident that CTGAN showed the best trade-off between precision and
recall, followed by Original, GAN, RUS, CART, ROS and SMOTE.
Misclassifications
Some traffic types could be more easily detected than others as shown in table 4.4.
From the bottom of the table, the traffic types DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP, DoS attacksSlowHTTPTest, DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP, DoS attacks-GoldenEye were 100% detected by all the different NIDS models. The GAN was the only one that didn’t
improve detection of DoS attacks-Hulk and increased Brute Force-XSS and SQL Injection misclassification.
Interestingly CTGAN was the only data-augmentation technique that improved
DDOS attack-HOIC detection, while other methods lead to worse — higher misclassifications — on DDOS attack-HOIC. Similar to DoS attacks-Slowloris CTGAN was
the only one that showed improvement.
The only method capable of improving bot detection was ROS, although further
investigation is required to check if ROS didn’t cause the model to overfit. The other
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Number of Samples Misclassified
Original ROS RUS

SMOTE

CART

GAN

CTGAN

295

790

500

810

523

224

90

Brute Force -Web

69

10

27

8

28

72

35

DoS attacks-Slowloris

24

24

24

25

24

25

18

Bot

9

4

11

9

11

30

13

DDOS attack-HOIC

2

13

14

12

14

15

2

SQL Injection

8

2

4

1

3

10

2

Brute Force -XSS

5

0

0

0

2

13

3

DoS attacks-Hulk

2

0

0

0

0

2

0

DoS attacks-GoldenEye

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

DDoS attacks-LOIC-HTTP

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

DoS attacks-SlowHTTPTest

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

DDOS attack-LOIC-UDP

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

119

53

80

55

82

167

73

790

500

810

523

224

90

843

580

865

605

391

163

Benign

Total Attacks

Total Benign 295
Total

414

Table 4.4: Number of Misclassified Samples
methods lead to worse or no difference in results for bot. SMOTE and ROS showed
competitive results for Brute Force-Web.
The deep learning methods were the only ones that reduced misclassification on
benign samples, all other methods lead to increased benign traffic misclassification,
which relates to findings discussed in previous subsection.
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Conclusion
5.1

Research Overview

The objective of this research was to compare the effect of using data augmentation
techniques to generate samples to augment the minority classes of the CICIDS2018.
The impact was measured by using the augmented dataset to train a random forest
classifier model, which was then in terms of precision, recall and F1-Score.
The experiments were performed on CICIDS2018, a big dataset and one of the
newest network intrusion detection benchmarking datasets available for public use.
The experiment was composed of three main parts: augmenting an imbalanced dataset
using different methods; evaluating the quality of the synthetic data in terms of similarity to the real data counterpart; and finally comparing how much influence each
data balancing method had on a binary classification task executed by a random forest,
measured in terms of precision, recall and F1-Score.

5.2

Problem Definition

The internet increases opportunities for businesses. On the other hand, being connected to the internet also increases the risks related to information security, which
may be associated to a regulatory requirement or protection of trade secrets, for example. A network intrusion detection system is capable of mitigating the risks coming
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from being connected to the internet by detecting or even better, containing intruders.
A NIDS can be implemented as a classification model to detect for anomalous patterns
by listening to the traffic flow of an enterprise computer network. In such network
many business applications would be running and exchanging information with nodes
inside and outside the company network boundaries, like a messaging application or
even an employee navigating the internet. It is expected that minority of the network
traffic would be malicious, being very small in proportion to the legitimate traffic.
Many classification problems have to deal with class imbalance which can have
a negative impact on a classifier performance, one example is the data of a network
intrusion detection system. The CICIDS2018 is a NIDS benchmark dataset that comprises of attacks and a network infrastructure that reflect the actual cyberspace, in
counterpart of datasets from twenty years ago that are still used by researchers.
As expected, major part of CICIDS2018 is comprised of benign traffic leading to
imbalanced learn issues that can be solved by augmenting the data using classic approaches like ROS, RUS, SMOTE, CART and also deep learning approaches such as
GAN and its derivative, CTGAN. GANs are a sophisticated neural network architecture capable of generating synthetic/fake data that can’t be distinguished between
real and fake, usually applied to images GANs are known to be difficult to train and
to be applied to tabular data. CTGAN is designed to improve the vanilla GAN to
generate synthetic tabular data, and can be used to overcome the imbalanced learn
problem in CICIDS2018.

5.3

Design/Experimentation, Evaluation & Results

The evaluation of synthetic data quality in section 4.2 allowed to answer the subquestion 1: To what extent are the synthetic generated samples are capable of
capturing the original data distribution and correlations? The histograms allowed
to understand the deep learning method’s behaviour and to workaround with experiments towards answering the research main question. It was possible to check that
the vanilla GAN did suffer from mode collapse, since some columns got stuck to a
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single mode. Thus, limiting the quality of the samples generated by the GAN and
consequently impacting the classifier efficiency.
Pairwise correlation measures the capability of the synthetic generation method
to capture the real data distribution it was trained on. RUS had the best pairwise
correlation which is expected since it is a subset of the original data. RUS pairwise correlation was followed by CTGAN, ROS, SMOTE being similar to CART, and
GAN with the lowest results. Showing that the capability of capturing feature interdependencies were important to some extend but it’s not necessarily enough to assure
machine learning efficiency, given the good pairwise correlation results for RUS and
CART.
From the results in table 4.3, the machine learning efficiency metric allowed to
answer sub-question 2: Will the data augmentation methods influence on the misclassification of each attack type? CTGAN was capable of improving the detection of
one attack type, DoS attacks-Slowloris that no other methods were capable of doing
so.
Machine learning efficiency metric also answers the Research question: To what
extent adding synthetic generated samples to augment the minority classes of CICIDS2018 dataset to train a random forest classifier model is capable of improving
the model precision, recall and F1-Score?
It was provided three interpretations to the results, depending on one strategy and
risk appetite to cyber security, ultimately is up to a business to decide what risks can
be accept and match with their requirements.
A more restrictive scenario could leverage from the methods that scored higher
on recall, such as ROS and SMOTE, the top 2 that scored similarly (ROS: 99.9385%,
SMOTE: 99.3262%). While a high score in precision, achieved by the CTGAN (99.9014%),
indicate that the method is the best at keeping a business running smoothly, since it
trains a less intrusive NIDS (RF) that is better at detecting benign traffic, the downside may be less security. The balance between security and functionality can be
achieved by leveraging the methods that scored the best F1-Score, which was the
CTGAN (99.9049%).
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Hence there’s information to contribute towards answering the research question, it
is possible to use data-augmentation methods to improve a random forest classification
task on the CICIDS2018 dataset.
The research question remains partially answered since this experiment didn’t provide statistical tests for the machine learning efficiency metric. Other limitation is
that due to computational resources restrictions only 5% of the dataset was used.
Considerable efforts was needed to use CTGAN to achieve such results, a bespoke
CTGAN model was trained for each attack category, demanding experimentation and
consumption of expensive computational resources that are required for such method.
Also using the CICIDS2018 Pawlicki et al. (2020) had better results with an
algorithm-level approach to deal with class imbalance. The results here are similar to
(Lee & Park, 2019a, 2019b) who successfully improved a random forest by augmented
data using deep learning methods on the CICIDS2017 (Sharafaldin et al., 2019), the
previous version of the dataset presented in this work.

5.4

Contributions and impact

This research tested different data augmentation methods to deal with imbalanced
learn in an up-to-date network intrusion detection benchmark dataset. The augmentation methods include CTGAN (L. Xu et al., 2019) a state-of-the-art improvement
of GAN to generate synthetic tabular data. The experiments demonstrated the capability of the CTGAN model to generate synthetic data for the CICIDS2018.
Through evaluation, it was found that synthetic data generated from a CTGAN
model, to deal with class imbalance did improve the classification task performance
in terms of precision, F1-Score, and still keep a high recall score. While much simpler
methods such as ROS and SMOTE performed better in recall than state-of-the-art
approaches.
This work has contributed towards dealing with the class imbalance problem present
on CICIDS2018, which was highlighted by (Leevy & Khoshgoftaar, 2020). Also extending the research on deep learning algorithms for synthetic data generation for the
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specific dataset.

5.5

Future Work & recommendations

CTGAN took a long time to train, with sometime spent on fitting Gaussian mixture
models to capture the modes of continuous columns, other methods to capture distribution modes could be explored. Hyperparameter tuning for the GAN and CTGAN
models was not fully explored and could produce substantial research. Both GAN and
CTGAN take a long time to train and also require more computational resources than
the other methods, while SMOTE still an interesting method to augment data due to
its simplicity to implement and fast training and sample generation. GAN and variants may be an interesting approach if one is looking to address privacy issues within
the data, which SMOTE doesn’t so well (Walia et al., 2020). GAN and derivatives
work well with images (Karras et al., 2019), which have a limited data range (0-255)
and may be difficult to generalise with broader data ranges.
Due to constraints of time and resources it was not possible to use enough data and
computational power to carry out the repeated measures necessary for tests of statistical significance, future work should look to work on results through statistical tests
thus providing a more robust case. Other classification models could be implemented
as a NIDS and class weights could be specified as an algorithm-level approach to deal
with the imbalanced learning problem, as mentioned in the literature review. Due to
the CICIDS2018 dataset size on around 10gb, a big data approach to the experiments
is an interesting path. CTGAN looks promising in generating synthetic tabular data
and in addressing the mode collapse issue.
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Karlsson, A., & Sjöberg, T. (2020). Synthesis of tabular financial data using generative adversarial networks (Unpublished master’s thesis). KTH, Mathematical Statistics.
Karras, T., Laine, S., & Aila, T. (2019, June). A style-based generator architecture
for generative adversarial networks. In Proceedings of the ieee/cvf conference on
computer vision and pattern recognition (cvpr).
Khalilia, M., Chakraborty, S., & Popescu, M. (2011). Predicting disease risks from
highly imbalanced data using random forest. BMC medical informatics and decision
making, 11 (1), 1–13.
Khraisat, A., Gondal, I., Vamplew, P., & Kamruzzaman, J. (2019). Survey of
intrusion detection systems: techniques, datasets and challenges. Cybersecurity, 2 (1),
1–22.
Lashkari., A. H., Gil., G. D., Mamun., M. S. I., & Ghorbani., A. A. (2017). Characterization of tor traffic using time based features. In Proceedings of the 3rd international
conference on information systems security and privacy - volume 1: Icissp, (p. 253262). SciTePress. doi: 10.5220/0006105602530262
Lee, J., & Park, K. (2019a). Ae-cgan model based high performance network intrusion
detection system. Applied Sciences, 9 (20). Retrieved from https://www.mdpi.com/
2076-3417/9/20/4221 doi: 10.3390/app9204221
Lee, J., & Park, K. (2019b). Gan-based imbalanced data intrusion detection system.
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 1–8. doi: 10.1007/s00779-019-01332-y
Leevy, J. L., & Khoshgoftaar, T. M. (2020). A survey and analysis of intrusion
detection models based on cse-cic-ids2018 big data. Journal of Big Data, 7 (1), 1–
19.

47

REFERENCES
Lin, Z., Khetan, A., Fanti, G., & Oh, S. (2017, 12). Pacgan: The power of two samples
in generative adversarial networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Information
Theory, PP . doi: 10.1109/JSAIT.2020.2983071
Mishra, S. (2017). Handling imbalanced data: Smote vs. random undersampling.
International Research Journal of Engineering and Technology (IRJET), 4 (8).
Nowok, B., Raab, G. M., & Dibben, C. (2016). synthpop: Bespoke creation of
synthetic data in r. Journal of Statistical Software, Articles, 74 (11), 1–26. Retrieved
from https://www.jstatsoft.org/v074/i11 doi: 10.18637/jss.v074.i11
Park, K., Song, Y., & Cheong, Y. (2018, March). Classification of attack types for
intrusion detection systems using a machine learning algorithm. In 2018 ieee fourth
international conference on big data computing service and applications (bigdataservice) (p. 282-286). doi: 10.1109/BigDataService.2018.00050
Parkinson de Castro, E. (2020). An examination of the smote and other smote-based
techniques that use synthetic data to oversample the minority class in the context
of credit-card fraud classification (Master’s thesis, Technological University Dublin).
doi: https://doi.org/10.21427/wj33-n221
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Feature Name

Description

ack cnt

Number of packets with ACK

atv avg

Mean time a flow was active before becoming idle

atv max

Maximum time a flow was active before becoming idle

atv min

Minimum time a flow was active before becoming idle

atv std

Standard deviation time a flow was active before becoming idle

bw blk rate avg Average number of bulk rate in the backward direction
bw byt blk avg

Average number of bytes bulk rate in the backward direction

bw hdr len

Total bytes used for headers in the forward direction

bw iat avg

Mean time between two packets sent in the backward direction

bw iat max

Maximum time between two packets sent in the backward direction

bw iat min

Minimum time between two packets sent in the backward direction

bw iat std

Standard deviation time between two packets sent in the backward direction

bw iat tot

Total time between two packets sent in the backward direction

bw pkt blk avg

Average number of packets bulk rate in the backward direction

Bw pkt l avg

Mean size of packet in backward direction

Bw pkt l max

Maximum size of packet in backward direction

Bw pkt l min

Minimum size of packet in backward direction

Bw pkt l std

Standard deviation size of packet in backward direction

bw pkt s

Number of backward packets per second

bw psh flag

Number of times the PSH flag was set in packets travelling in the backward direction (0 for UDP)

bw seg avg

Average size observed in the backward direction

bw urg flag

Number of times the URG flag was set in packets travelling in the backward direction (0 for UDP)

bw win byt

# of bytes sent in initial window in the backward direction

cwe cnt

Number of packets with CWE

down up ratio

Download and upload ratio

ece cnt

Number of packets with ECE

fin cnt

Number of packets with FIN

fl byt s

flow byte rate that is number of packets transferred per second

fl dur

Flow duration

fl iat avg

Average time between two flows

fl iat max

Maximum time between two flows

fl iat min

Minimum time between two flows

fl iat std

Standard deviation time two flows

fl pkt s

flow packets rate that is number of packets transferred per second

Fw act pkt

# of packets with at least 1 byte of TCP data payload in the forward direction

fw blk rate avg

Average number of bulk rate in the forward direction

fw byt blk avg

Average number of bytes bulk rate in the forward direction

fw hdr len

Total bytes used for headers in the forward direction

fw iat avg

Mean time between two packets sent in the forward direction

fw iat max

Maximum time between two packets sent in the forward direction
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Feature Name

Description

fw iat min

Minimum time between two packets sent in the forward direction

fw iat std

Standard deviation time between two packets sent in the forward direction

fw iat tot

Total time between two packets sent in the forward direction

fw pkt blk avg

Average number of packets bulk rate in the forward direction

fw pkt l avg

Average size of packet in forward direction

fw pkt l max

Maximum size of packet in forward direction

fw pkt l min

Minimum size of packet in forward direction

fw pkt l std

Standard deviation size of packet in forward direction

fw pkt s

Number of forward packets per second

fw psh flag

Number of times the PSH flag was set in packets travelling in the forward direction (0 for UDP)

fw seg avg

Average size observed in the forward direction

fw seg min

Minimum segment size observed in the forward direction

fw urg flag

Number of times the URG flag was set in packets travelling in the forward direction (0 for UDP)

fw win byt

Number of bytes sent in initial window in the forward direction

idl avg

Mean time a flow was idle before becoming active

idl max

Maximum time a flow was idle before becoming active

idl min

Minimum time a flow was idle before becoming active

idl std

Standard deviation time a flow was idle before becoming active

pkt len avg

Mean length of a flow

pkt len max

Maximum length of a flow

pkt len min

Minimum length of a flow

pkt len std

Standard deviation length of a flow

pkt len va

Minimum inter-arrival time of packet

pkt size avg

Average size of packet

pst cnt

Number of packets with PUSH

rst cnt

Number of packets with RST

subfl bw byt

The average number of bytes in a sub flow in the backward direction

subfl bw pkt

The average number of packets in a sub flow in the backward direction

subfl fw byt

The average number of bytes in a sub flow in the forward direction

subfl fw pk

The average number of packets in a sub flow in the forward direction

syn cnt

Number of packets with SYN

tot bw pk

Total packets in the backward direction

tot fw pk

Total packets in the forward direction

tot l fw pkt

Total size of packet in forward direction

urg cnt

Number of packets with URG

Table A.1: CICIDS2018 Columns (Sharafaldin. et al., 2018)
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Figure A.1: GAN Histograms
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Figure A.2: CTGAN Histograms
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Figure A.3: GAN pairwise correlation matrix comparison with real data
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Figure A.4: CTGAN pairwise correlation matrix comparison with real data
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